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1.Living in a computable world
Those of us old enough may remember being fascinated by George Gamow’s popular 
books on mathematics and science - with the most famous being  “One Two Three ... 
Infinity” . In it, he got us to imagine living on the surface of a 2-dimensional balloon, with 
only 2-dimensional experience of the surface. And then got us to understand how we 
might detect its 3-dimensional curved character via purely 2-dimensional observations. 
Here is his picture from page 103 of the 1961 edition:
Algorithms, as a way of traversing our four dimensions have been with us for literally 
thousands of years. They provide recipes for the control and understanding of every 
aspect of everyday life. Nowadays, they appear as computer programs. Algorithms, or 
computer programs, can be thought of as a kind of causal dimension all of their own. And 
then the questions arise: Is there a causal dimension that is not algorithmic? And does it 
matter if there is?
Notice that George Gamow’s example showed that on the one hand it was tricky to live in 
two dimensions and find evidence of a third. And that it did matter, precisely because we 
could find that evidence. Of course, if we took the mathematical model presented by the 
picture, the missing dimension becomes clear to us - we have an overview. But observe, 
while the mathematical overview gives us a better understanding of the nature of curved 
space, it does not tell us that the model is relevant to our world. We still need to look at the 
triangle from within the two dimensional world to match up reality and mathematics, and be 
able to apply the full power of the model.
Back in the 1930s, people like Kurt Gödel, Stephen Kleene, Alonzo Church and Alan 
Turing did build mathematical models of the computable dimension of causal relations. 
And this enabled Church and Turing to get outside it, and by examining the model identify 
the new dimension of incomputability. 
A specially important part of what the 24 year-old Alan Turing did was to base his 
investigation of the extent of the computable on a new machine-like model. And the Turing 
machine was to make him famous in a way he could never have foreseen. He had the idea 
of using Gödel’s coding trick to turn his Turing machine programs into data the machine 
could compute from - and hence was born the universal Turing machine, able to take a 
code for any other given machine as input data, and to compute exactly like it. The 
universal machine stored programs: and so gave us an understanding of the modern 
stored-program computer before anyone had even built a real one. 
This caused all sorts of problems. Just like with George Gamow’s example, it was easy to 
get the mathematical overview. The problem was to match it up with reality. And this was a 
problem with a practical aspect. Even a toy avatar of the abstract machine was hard to 
make. The engineers eventually came up with clever solutions to the problem, the EDVAC 
in Pennsylvania, the Manchester ‘Baby’, Maurice Wilkes’ EDSAC, and the Pilot ACE 
growing out of Turing’s own attempts to build a computer at the NPL. But to this day, there 
are engineers who don’t forgive (or understand even) Turing’s reputation as the ‘inventor’ 
of the computer. 
More importantly, the computer changed every aspect of our lives, and strengthened our 
experience of living in a computable world. Incomputability became a mathematical oddity, 
a playground for researchers who were not too concerned about real world significance, 
but liked doing hard mathematics with a distinct feel of reality. Of course it felt like reality. It 
was real numbers connected by computable relations - a bit like a well-behaved scientific 
world of information, structured by computable causal relations.
2. A short history of incomputability
Computability has always been with us. The universe is full of it - natural laws whose 
computability enables us to survive in the world; animal and human behaviour guided by 
biological and learned algorithms; computable natural constants such as π and e. The 
algorithmic content gives the mathematics of nature its infinitary character, and opens the 
door to incomputability. Richard Feynman may have said (Feynman 1982) “It is really true, 
somehow, 
that the physical world is representable in a discretized way, and ... we are going to have 
to change the laws of physics”: but real numbers persist in the mathematics of the real 
world.
There have ever been doubts about our ability to make sense of causality. And adding 
deities may emphasise the problem. It certainly goes back to the 11th century and Al-
Ghazali’s “The Incoherence of the Philosophers”, and is traceable through Hume and 
Berkeley, arriving, for instance, at the modern interest in emergent phenomena. According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary (1971 edition), the first recorded use of the word 
‘incomputable’ goes back to 1606 - some 40 years even before ‘computable’. The term 
only acquired its precise meaning in the 1930s, with the formulation of a number of 
different models of what it means for a function over the natural numbers to be 
computable. And, as we already mentioned, it was these enabled Church and Turing to get 
their examples of incomputable objects. The key observation, captured in what we now 
know as the Church-Turing Thesis, is that there is a robust intuitive notion of computability 
to which all our different formalisms converge. It was Turing’s carefully argued 1936 paper, 
based on the Turing machine model, that convinced Gödel it was true. 
As Gödel’s friend Hao Wang recounts (Reflections on Kurt Gödel, 1987, p.96):
Over the years G habitually credited A. M. Turing’s paper of 1936 as the 
definitive work in capturing the intuitive concept [of computability], and did not 
mention Church or E. Post in this connection. He must have felt that Turing was 
the only one who gave persuasive arguments to show the adequacy of the 
precise concept ... In particular, he had probably been aware of the arguments 
offered by Church for his ‘thesis’ and decided that they were inadequate. It is 
clear that G and Turing (1912-1954) had great admiration for each other, ... 
Within mathematics, Turing’s paper was a blow to David Hilbert’s view, famously 
expressed on September 8th in a Königsberg address, that:
For the mathematician there is no Ignorabimus, and, in my opinion, not at all for 
natural science either. . . . The true reason why [no one] has succeeded in 
finding an unsolvable problem is, in my opinion, that there is no unsolvable 
problem. In contrast to the foolish Ignorabimus, our credo avers:                     
We must know, We shall know.
The universality of Turing’s machine meant it had to implement a lot of faulty programs. 
Some programs would lead to computations that never stopped. And one could not tell in 
general which inputs led to a proper computation. The Halting Problem for the Universal 
Turing Machine (UTM) turns out to be unsolvable. Or, if you want the full story: The set of 
inputs which lead to a terminating computation of the UTM is computably enumerable - 
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you can progressively set in motion an array of all possible computations and observe 
which ones output a result. This enables you to enumerate the inputs on which the 
machine halts. But - this set is not computable, since you can never be certain that a 
computation in progress will not one day succeed. 
More dramatically, all sorts of mathematical theories are capable of ‘talking about’ our 
UTM. Turing used natural numbers to code up the activities of the machine, using the trick 
Gödel had earlier used to enable Peano arithmetic to talk about itself. Turing’s discovery 
was that any reasonably strong mathematical theory was undecidable - that is, had an 
incomputable set of theorems. In particular, Turing had a proof of what became known as 
Church’s Theorem - telling us that there is no computer program for testing a statement in 
natural language for logical validity. Since then a huge number of undecidable theories 
have been found. 
The drawback to this powerful technique for proving the existence of many natural 
incomputable sets, is that there are no other good techniques for proving incomputability. 
And John Myhill showed in 1955 that the known natural examples of incomputable objects 
tended to be all the same; computationally, just notational translations of each other. This 
would not have mattered, if it were not for the fact that the so-called Turing universe of 
incomputable sets turned out to have a very rich and mathematically challenging structure. 
And if this were to be embodied in the real world to any extent, most of the computational 
character of its embodiment would be hidden from us. If we managed to solve a problem, 
all well and good. If we failed, we might never know whether that bit of the world had an 
incomputable character different from that of the halting problem, or might be computable 
via some program which eludes us so far. 
This simple difficulty with recognising mathematical incomputability was explained by 
results which told us such recognition was itself a highly incomputable problem. And here 
were all the ingredients for a parting of the ways between the mathematics and real-world 
concerns. Turing himself made his last great contribution to the logic of computability 
theory in his amazing 1939 paper, based on his work with Alonzo Church in Princeton. 
After that his work was more obviously rooted in reality than the earlier overarching 
abstraction. The mathematicians had the halting problem and its variants, mathematically 
comprehensive and canonical, a little too grandiose for the everyday ad hoc world. While 
the endless complications of everyday existence could not be classified - the theory was 
useless. 
For the recursion theoretic period of the mathematics, with its isolation and loss of a sense 
of real-world remit, see recent papers by Robert I. Soare. Turing’s Manchester work on AI, 
connectionist models, and morphogenesis were pointers to the confusions and inspired 
anticipations of the shape of things to come. 
3. Mathematical steps towards an incomputable reality
The 1930s unsolvable problems may be examples of incomputable objects, but their 
mathematical abstraction appears far from the embodied mathematics of a Newton or 
Einstein. And the deep and intractable problems from the real world are hard to subject to 
logical analysis. What makes Turing’s work so important is the way it draws out the 
computability-theoretic core of very different real world mysteries. He had a knack of 
getting inside structures and imaging their constructive cores in new ways. Typically, 
Turing does not apply mathematics, he builds it within the context he is exploring. When 
Einstein says (Albert Einstein, p.54, ‘Out of My Later Years, 1950):
When we say that we understand a group of natural phenomena, we mean that 
we have found a constructive theory which embraces them.
Turing takes it literally. And mathematics for a Turing often comes mentally embodied. The 
for many repellent abstraction of Turing’s 1939 paper is all about how Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem plays out in practice. We notice that the true sentence 
unprovable in Gödel’s theory for arithmetic is easily described. And that enlarging our 
theory by adding the sentence gives us a larger theory, which has a similarly described 
unprovable sentence. For Turing this was the seed for a computably iterated process of 
enlargement. And using Kleene’s computable ordinals, one could extend the process 
transfinitely. Later, logicians such as Solomon Feferman and Michael Rathjen would 
enhance Turing’s ladder into the incomputable, and proof-theoretically reach levels far 
beyond where Turing had got to. But in a sense, Turing had found out what he wanted to 
know. Tucked away amongst the mountains of abstraction is his characteristically candid 
take on what he had done (Turing 1939, pp.134–5):
Mathematical reasoning may be regarded ... as the exercise of a combination 
of ... intuition and ingenuity. ... In pre-Gödel times it was thought by some that 
all the intuitive judgements of mathematics could be replaced by a finite number 
of ... rules. The necessity for intuition would then be entirely eliminated. In our 
discussions, however, we have gone to the opposite extreme and eliminated 
not intuition but ingenuity, and this in spite of the fact that our aim has been in 
much the same direction.
And mathematically, we have a brilliant analysis of how we may constructively navigate 
our way through a phase transition, but storing up a level of incomputability arising from 
the ad hoc nature of the route. There is a degree of arbitrariness in a climber’s choice of 
hand and foot holds, which gives the climb more than algorithmic interest. This ties in with 
an irreversibility of computation noted by people such as Prigogine in quite different 
contexts. 
There is a special interest for the mathematician in Turing’s analysis of an incomputable 
route to a computable outcomes. It fits nicely with our experience of finding our theorems 
creatively, and then digging out an algorithmic route to them: something with a memetic 
character which circulates the community like a virus. A basic rule for lifting small truths to 
bigger ones, a logical counterpart of the more visceral causality of nature, is mathematical 
induction. For proof theorists induction plays a key role. They categorise theorems 
according to the level of complexity of the induction used in the proof. Most theorems turn 
out to be proof-theoretically very simple. Now that we have a proof of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem,  the logician Angus MacIntyre has been able to outline it within first-order 
arithmetic. This view of the proof involves simple incremental accretions of truth. The 
discovery of the proof was something very different. And so is our understanding of it. 
We are beginning to see a pattern - literally: simple rules, unbounded iteration, emergent 
forms - defined at the edge of computability. This is just what Turing later observed in 
nature and mathematically tried to capture.
Another hugely important mathematical tool to take on our explorations of the 
incomputable is the oracle Turing machine, also tucked away, on one page of Turing’s 
1939 paper. The idea was to allow the machine to compute relative to a given real, which 
may or may not be computable. If one looked at the function computed using this oracle, 
you could see it as a computation of the function from the given oracle real. And it is a 
small step to summarise what the machine does as computing one real from another. It 
delivers us a computational model within which to fit basic computable laws of nature - 
namely, most of what underlies our knowledge of how the world works. Harking back to the 
computable numbers of 1936, the oracle machine computes a real number, but from 
another real number. We can allow the machine to compute relative to different oracles,  
then acknowledging the higher type nature of the computational process by calling the 
mappings computed by oracle machines Turing functionals. These, acting over the reals, 
give us the Turing universe.
In fact, Turing was not notably interested in the mathematical development of his oracle 
machines, despite his preoccupation with computers that interacted. It was left to another 
seminal figure, Emil Post, to gather together equivalence classes of reals - or degrees of 
unsolvability - which were computable from each other. And then, using an ordering 
induced by the ordering of reals via Turing functionals, obtain a structure which has 
become known simply as the Turing degrees. 
The three things you need to know about this structure are: Firstly that it is very complex; 
Secondly, that if you take some scientific domain described in terms of real numbers and 
computable laws over them, then it is embeddable in the Turing universe - so that the 
structure of the corresponding restriction of the Turing universe tells you something about 
the causal structure of the real world (the causal third dimension of the Gamow-like 2-
dimensional person we met earlier); And thirdly, we can view this model as a terrain in 
which computation can be hosted, but in which information takes a leading role, structuring 
the form of the computation - a re-embodiment of computation. 
4.Messages from the real world
Turing’s final years in Manchester saw both personal eclipse, and the sowing of the seeds 
of a later renaissance - a growing renown and increasing scientific impact. The fame is a 
mixed blessing. All those webpages and articles in periodicals with misleading information 
about what Turing did and did not do. On the other hand, having mathematicians like 
Turing and Gödel in the public eye are good for basic science. As far as the science itself 
goes, Turing’s work has been powerfully influential in a piecemeal way, with a number of 
different fields laying claim to particular bits of Turing. In the October 2004 Notices of the 
AMS, Lenore Blum wrote a nice description of the dichotomy between  “two traditions of 
computation” (in Computing over the Reals: Where Turing Meets Newton, pp. 1024-1034):
The two major traditions of the theory of computation have, for the most part, 
run a parallel non-intersecting course. On the one hand, we have numerical 
analysis and scientific computation; on the other hand, we have the tradition of 
computation theory arising from logic and computer science.
Turing’s 1948 Rounding-off errors in matrix processes was influential in the former, and the 
1936 Turing machine paper in the latter. 
But there is a growing appreciation of the coherence of approach represented by these 
different contributions. On the one hand we have a computational world over which we 
have control; in the other we must live 
with approximations and errors. As we 
move up the informational type structure 
from discrete to continuous data, we lose 
the sure footholds, but identify emergent 
controls at higher levels. Turing had 
earlier introduced Bayesian codebreaking 
methods at Bletchley Park, in another 
adjustment to the realities of extracting 
form from a complex world.
Turings late great contributions traced the 
computational content of phase 
transitions in the real world from two 
different vantage points. Turing had been 
interested in the emergence of form in 
nature from his school days - see his 
mother’s sketch of Alan “Watching the 
Daisies Grow”.  A short piece by Peter 
Saunders in the forthcoming Alan Turing - 
His Work and Impact (edited by Cooper 
and van Leeuwen) discusses Turing’s 
motivation and background reading in 
getting interested in morphogenesis. He 
writes:
The obvious question to ask about “The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis” is 
why Turing took up the problem at all. Pattern formation, interesting though it 
may be to biologists, does not look like the sort of fundamental problem that 
Turing characteristically chose to devote his time and effort to. The answer is 
simply that he saw it not as a mere puzzle but as a way of addressing what he 
considered to be a crucial issue in biology. As he said to his student Robin 
Gandy, his aim was to “defeat the argument from design”.
It seems Turing wanted to add a bit more computational convergence to Darwin’s theory, 
and not leave an opportunity for God to tidy up. In the same volume, Philip Maini outlines 
the way in which Turing produced complex outcomes from simple algorithmic ingredients: 
Alan Turing’s paper, “The chemical basis of morphogenesis” (Turing, 1952) has 
been hugely influential in a number of areas. In this paper, Turing proposed that 
biological pattern formation arises in response to a chemical pre-pattern which, 
in turn, is set up by a process which is now known as diffusion-driven instability. 
The genius of this work was that he considered a system which was stable in 
the absence of diffusion and then showed that the addition of diffusion, which is 
naturally stabilizing, actually caused an instability. Thus it was the integration of 
the parts that was as crucial to the understanding of embryological development 
as the parts themselves - patterns emerged or self-organized as a result of the 
individual parts interacting. To see how far ahead of his time he was, one has to 
note that it is only now in the post-genomic era of systems biology that the 
majority of the scientific community has arrived at the conclusion he came to 
some 60 years ago.
Things have moved on since 1952, but the 
basic approach retains a powerful influence 
on the field, hardly noticed by logicians and 
computer scientists as a group. 
More importantly for us, Turing’s examples 
point to general principles underlying 
emergent phenomena. Turing would have 
been a teenager at the time the ‘British 
emergentists’ such as C. D. Broad, Samuel 
Alexander, and C. Lloyd Morgan were at 
their height. Broad and Turing overlapped at 
Cambridge. As a group they were very 
prescient in their seeking out examples of 
the complex arising from simple rules in 
highly connected environments. 
Unfortunately, some of their examples of 
emergence taken from chemistry turned out 
to be explainable in terms of quantum 
mechanics. But Turing’s differential 
equations gave us a new sense both of the 
character and the origins of emergence, and indicated how emergent form night be 
captured mathematically. 
Turing’s equations might well have computable solutions. But they pointed to the principle 
of emergent patterns on animal coats etc. corresponding to definable relations over basic 
mathematical structure. If one could define a relation in nature, it had a robustness, a 
tangible presence which one might expect to find observable; just as Turing had brought 
us to expect observed emergent phenomena to have descriptions. Descriptions which 
might lead to incomputable sets if at least as complicated as that giving us the halting 
problem. Somewhere between the tidy abstraction of the universal Turing machine and the 
mysteries of emergence in nature, we have the fractal family. Well known as analogues of 
emergent phenomena, they also have their own well-defined mathematics. For various 
reasons the most informative of these is the Mandelbrot set. As Roger Penrose puts it in 
his 1994 book on The Emperor’s New Mind:
Now we witnessed ... a certain 
extraordinarily complicated looking set, 
namely the Mandelbrot set.  Although the 
rules which provide its definition are 
surprisingly simple, the set itself exhibits an 
endless variety of highly elaborate 
structures.
With its definition based on a well-known simple 
equation over the complex numbers, the 
quantifier form of its complement can be reduced 
to something similar to that of the halting set of 
the UTM. And using this one can simulate it on a 
computer screen, getting the fascinating range of 
images we recognise so easily. It has what the the halting problem does not, the visual 
embodiment of a natural phenomenon. And this enables us to appreciate the higher-order 
intricacy we encounter as we travel deeper and deeper into this endlessly surprising 
mathematical object. It is harder to be sure of ones notion of computability in this context. 
But for the computable analysts, the computability of the Mandelbrot set is still a 
challenging open problem.
Compared to other levels of the real world that Turing was drawn to, the emergence 
seems relatively straightforwardly mathematical. One has an objective view of the whole 
picture, basic rules and emergence of a surprising character - the surprise is one of the 
criteria for emergence, though there is no proper definition. Mathematically, we tend to 
look for quantifiers or non linearity in the description based on the basic operations, a kind 
of association of true emergence with halting problem-like incomputability. At the quantum 
level, which Turing was always very interested in, but did not live long enough to get a grip  
on - the problem of pinning down the basic causality is not so easy. We are looking down 
from above, and are never sure we have the whole picture. And the phase transition from 
quantum ambiguity to familiar classical world seems to involve not just definability, but a 
transition from a structure in which there are some prohibitions on simultaneous definition 
of entities - something familiar to model-theorists - which disappear as one passes from 
particle physics to other scientific areas. There is experimental evidence that such 
breakdowns of definability occur in human mentality. The problem we as observers have in 
this context is not one of viewing from above, but of being trapped inside; although modern 
neuroscience is augmenting this inner view with a huge amount of useful information. 
In his final years, Turing approached brain functionality from two directions: mathematically 
modelling the physical connectivity of the brain; and via his much better known discussion 
of intelligent thought. The latter is of special interest for mathematicians, and not just for its 
relevance to incomputability. Around the same time as Turing was approaching ‘intuition 
and ingenuity’ via his hierarchical analysis of the limits of Gödel’s theorem, Jacques 
Hadamard was covering very similar ground from a more sociological viewpoint. Given 
that the mathematical product is presented algorithmically via a proof, it makes 
mathematical thinking a good case study for clarifying the ‘intuition versus ingenuity’ 
dichotomy. A principal source for Hadamard’s 1945 book The Psychology of Invention in 
the Mathematical Field were lectures of Henri Poincare to the Société de Psychologie in 
Paris in the early part of the 20th century. Here is Hadamard’s account of an example of 
apparent non-algorithmic thinking:
At first Poincaré attacked [a problem] vainly for a fortnight, attempting to prove 
there could not be any such function ... [quoting Poincaré]:
‘Having reached Coutances, we entered an omnibus to go some place or other. 
At the moment when I put my foot on the step, the idea came to me, without 
anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it ... I did not 
verify the idea ... I went on with a conversation already commenced, but I felt a 
perfect certainty. On my return to Caen, for conscience sake, I verified the result 
at my leisure.’
Many writers focus on the surprise and dissociation from consciously rational thought. 
What is also striking is the connection with Turing’s 1939 paper - the ‘perfect certainty’ that 
Poincaré experienced. Did Poincaré have all the details of the proof immediately sorted in 
his mind? Unlikely. What we understand from Turing’s analysis is that there is a process of 
definition, with a range of codes for proofs emerging. It was one of these codes extracted 
by  Poincaré on his return on his return to Caen. 
As well as the connection back to Turing’s 1939 paper, there is the connection forward to 
his 1952 paper and the final work defining emergence of form in nature. Since 1954, 
neuroscience is one of the areas in which emergence has taken centre-stage for many 
researchers. And Turing’s connection between definability in terms of both logical structure 
and physical context is an remarkable anticipation of current thinking. 
At the bottom of the process is the basic physical functionality, and Turing made his own 
groundbreaking contribution to connectionist models of the brain in his unpublished 1948 
National Physical Laboratory report on Intelligent Machinery. Called unorganised 
machines by Turing, they were pre-empted by the more famous neural nets of McCulloch 
and Pitts. See Christof Teuscher’s book on Turing’s Connectionism.  These are Teuscher’s 
comments on the history in his commentary on Intelligent Machinery  in Alan Turing - His 
Work and Impact:
In his work, Turing makes no reference to McCulloch and Pitts’ 1943 paper, nor 
do they mention Turing’s work [on unorganised machines]. It is an open 
question how much their work influenced each other, yet, we have to assume 
that they were at least aware of each other’s ideas. We hypothesize that both 
bad timing and the fact that Turing’s neurons are simpler and more abstract 
contributed to his work being largely ignored.
Connectionist models have come a long way since Turing’s time. Their physical emulation 
of the brain does bring dividends. Paul Smolensky, for instance, talks in his 1988 paper On 
the proper treatment of connectionism of a possible challenge to “the strong construal of 
Church’s Thesis as the claim that the class of well-defined computations is exhausted by 
those of Turing machines.”
Of course, it was the celebrated 1950 Mind paper on Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence that became one of Turing’s three most cited papers. And the Turing Test for 
intelligence has entered the popular culture, with students walking around with T-shirts 
proclaiming “I failed the Turing Test”. 
So what is all this to do with the mathematics 
of incomputability? For all Turing’s focus on the 
logical structure of computation, which has had 
a huge influence on modern thinking - 
particularly since Bletchley Park Turing was 
involved in many ways with embodied 
computation. This involved an implicit 
recognition of a difference in the way humans 
and intelligent machines in general, interacted 
- were embedded in - information. And this was 
a necessary attribute of intelligence. People 
involved with taking artificial intelligence 
forward have had to take on board this 
extended, embodied, physical, information 
respecting, model of the future. We give some 
brief excerpts from Rodney Brooks’ 
contribution  (The Case For Embodied 
Intelligence) to Alan Turing - His Work and 
Impact:
For me Alan Turing’s 1948 paper Intelligent Machinery was more important than 
his 1950 paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence. ... 
For me, the critical, and new, insights in Intelligent Machinery were two fold.
First, Turing made the distinction between embodied and disembodied 
intelligence. ...
Modern researchers are now seriously investigating the emobodied approach to 
intelligence and have rediscovered the importance of interaction with people as 
the basis for intelligence. My own work for the last twenty five years has been 
based on these two ideas. 
5. Turing points the way past the Turing barrier
Alan Turing’s work was incomplete, as it will be for all of us when the final day comes. For 
Turing it came too early, via an uneasy confluence of algorithm (the UK law of the time) 
and incomputability, a bizarre piece of history that nobody could have invented for a man 
who had served mathematics and science - and his country - so well. Some have 
questioned the description ‘computability theory’ for the subject Turing co-founded with 
other luminaries of the period - Godel, Post, Church, Kleene - because it deals primarily 
with the incomputable. 
Turing was a mathematician of his time, who worked from within the world, trying to give 
mathematical substance to the physical and mental processes. He encountered many 
interesting things which he left those who came after to take forward. He gave us a basic 
model of what we understand to be computation. And took observation of it as an organic 
whole to the next level, discovering incomputability, a definability-theoretic extension of 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. He encouraged us to see the universe as something 
which does compute, and engaged with its features, tracing embodied analogues of his 
halting problem within biology and neuroscience. He loved the truth, and was open to 
doubts about his doubts. He thought a machine could not be intelligent if it was expected 
to be infallible. He saw something different about 
an embedded computer, and was drawn to the 
computational mysteries of quantum theory. 
Turing did not live long enough to appreciate 
Stephen Kleene’s investigations of higher-type 
computability, but would surely have made the 
connection between the mathematics of 
incomputability, definability, and the 
computations that arise from them. He did not 
see the mathematical theory of randomness 
flourish, or the yearly award of a prize in his 
name for a subject he played a founding role in. 
He never saw the employment of thousands 
who talked about ‘Turing’ machines and a 
‘Turing’ Test. The ‘incomputable reality’ (as 
Nature recently described it) is still dangerous 
to inhabit. But we do have a lot to celebrate in 
2012. 
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